neonprimetime security , just trying to help: February 2017

Tuesday, February 21, 2017

Customs Banned Goods Adobe Phish

Adobe Phish

From: "CUSTOMS SERVICES"

Attachment: BANNED GOODS.html (md5 e1e0e1d1720dbcc536c2f596d76627d9 , Virus Total has 19/55)

Body: PLEASE FIND THE ATTACHED LIST OF NEWLY BANNED GOODS BY THE GOVERNMENT

Open the attachment and see this pretty convincing page (pic below) with nice background that makes it look like you're in Adobe Reader instead of a browser

It contain the following ...

alert .... Document is Highly Secured by Microsoft INC. Requires Email Authentication: Kindly Sign in with your correct email and password to view Document
title ... PDF Online
form method ... POST ... action= hxxp://send.akataali[.]us/pdnew.php

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Saturday, February 18, 2017

Phishing Site with Search Engine Detection

Continuing discussing @Techhelplistcom's post a dhl/stripe phish site

hxxp://bitadze[.]ge/wp-includes/

The http.zip file also contained X-x-X.php which appears to be search engine/bot/crawler detection ... in theory returns 404 not found for search engines trying to index the site and 200 success for the victims. The idea probably being that they don't want their pages to show up in search engines, they want them hidden from the internet except for when they send out their links in phishing emails. Probably extends the lifetime and thus success rate of their phishing campaign.

Full code here

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Attacker Emailed himself your Phished Credentials

@Techhelplistcom posted a dhl/stripe phish site

hxxp://bitadze[.]ge/wp-includes/

The site was still wide open so you could view the http.zip file and in particular under the stripe phish the tfo.php file which is a good example of visibility behind the scenes to see what an attacker is doing with your phished credentials after you enter your data in and click submit on their malicious site

As you can see the attacker grabs your ip address

$ip = $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'];

What browser you're using

$useragent = $_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT'];

Your email & password

$message .= "EMAIL : ".$_POST['1KDL23']."\n";
$message .= "PASSWORD : ".$_POST['FZ32FEZ2345']."\n";

and sends it to himself

$send="fastpay147@gmail.com";

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Wordpress Config as homepage

@wavellan posted a spam and phishing url.

hxxp://enerjietudu[.]com/

Interesting if you browse to the homepage you get returned the wp-config.php file

Full contents here

And like every good wp-config.php file it contains information such as

define('DB_NAME', 'enerjik3460');
define('DB_USER', 'enerjik34');
define('DB_PASSWORD', 'energy34');
define('DB_HOST', '94.73.144.196');

And all the encryption deets

define('AUTH_KEY', ...
define('SECURE_AUTH_KEY',
define('LOGGED_IN_KEY',
define('NONCE_KEY',
define('AUTH_SALT',
define('SECURE_AUTH_SALT',
define('LOGGED_IN_SALT',
define('NONCE_SALT', ...

All the comments are in Turkish per google translate.

The bottom has an error showing the full path we are sitting in

Fatal error: Call to undefined function wp() in /home/enerjietudu.com/httpdocs/wp-blog-header.php on line 22

I notice that no matter which page I go to (wp-admin/admin.php, etc.) the wp-config.php contents show and an error is thrown.

If I had to guess I think somebody hacked this wordpress site by finding a vulnerability in the wordpress blog header, they found some vulnerability that outputs the content of a file, and so of course they chose the wp-config.php file, and now it's being displayed in the header of every page you navigate to. Then they used that output to login and take control of the database and then were able to use the database to write files to the www root folder and use it in phishing campaigns.

I don't claim to know everything, I'm just guessing. Anybody want to explain what really happened? Thanks!

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Thursday, February 16, 2017

Cerber payload generator with different hashes

@MlwrHpstr posted a cerber url

freeflamec[.]top/read.php?f=1.gif

If you go directly to the link it'll download a file

If you run md5sum on the file you'll get a hash

c27b380afa8e88d2eba7c58a97d31be1

If you search that md5 on virus total

Which shows you some interesting details about it

If you run strings you'll see this is no php file, this is no .gif file, this is a windows executable

Something else interesting is that this web server read.php script is setup to only serve certain parameter values. If you try to pass in something like 2.gif instead of 1.gif you get an http 200 but no file.

If you try to leave the f parameter empty, you actually get a file but it's 0 bytes and empty

Thus I would venture to guess there are other parameter values you could pass that may serve up different payloads.

Also if you go to the root of the site they have it redirecting to godaddy.com so this is not a compromised site, it's simply a site setup with malicious purposes to serve certain hidden payloads.

If you type in any random php page name that doesn't exist you'll be able to tell the web server version it's running ( Apache/2.2.15 (CentOS) Server )

Poking around found another page that works (admin.php instead of read.php)

Which delivers a different payload with different hash ( 6ab4bfd0fa555fc570188af13409a669 ) which gives different virus total hits, another EXE

Actually it's interesting, this php file generates random cerber EXEs with different hashes every time you re-load it.

Good example of why signature based tools like AV are dying, because of stuff like this that is probably the same exact payload just slightly modified so that the hash changes every time.

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Apple Phish

@illegalFawn posted some phishing sites.

One of them was hxxp://login-memberupdated[.]info/appleid.apple.com

If you view source, there's not much there because they're trying to obfuscate and avoid detection by various security tools.

On the top it's interesting, looks like the phish likely involves collecting the user's credit cards.

On the bottom you see some ugly encrypted variables and then a call to Aes.Ctr.decrypt to decrypt it. To determine what this is, you can save the assets/js/enc.js file, append to the bottom of it the 3 variables (hea2p, hea2t, and output) and put html and script tags around, then load save as a .html file, so you've created a safe benign html file that creates some variables but doesn't actually execute or write anything to the page.

Then load that html file locally in your browser. Notice the page will load as a blank white page, but that's ok. Then hit f12, go into developer tools, go to the console, type 'output' to display the contents of the output variable.

Now if you're familiar with HTML you can quickly see it's the apple phish page that we saw in our first screenshot. You'll see an iframe used for loading the signin page content.

If you were to login to that page you would find the username, password fields, login button, and php page that the login is posted to. That is going to be the page harvesting the credentials.

If you were to enter your credentials, the phish tells you your account is locked and you must unlock it.

Now we get sent to a verify page ( Verify.php ) which wants us to enter in all kinds of personal info.

Including as we already assumed from above based on the javascript credit card filtering, it asks for your credit card number.

If you enter all your personal info if will say account verified (and in this case apparently a php error) ... then redirect you back to the real appleid login page.