Thursday, April 29, 2021

Threat Library - Agent Tesla

 Agent Tesla

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date: 5/5/2021

delivery: Unknown

persistence: scheduled Task, \Updates\SPjSKjh, c:\users\<userid>\appdata\roaming\spjskih.exe

capabilities (per memory strings): Keylogger (KeyDown, KeyboardState, StartKeyLogger), Credential Theft (UCBrowser, Vivaldi, Thunderbird, etc.)

c2s: unknown

identification method: filname similar to previous (vbc.exe) and other patterns match like re-launch EXE after 1min45sec, smtp type c2 possible, etc.

special notes: .net executable, starts execution at about ~14 to 15mb initially, waits about 1 min 45 seconds, then relaunched itself, new pid, 2nd executable waits several minutes to do anything, then checks for credentials (chrome, qqbrowser, ultravnc, thunderbird, waterfox, etc.) through disk and registry, in memory strings on 2nd end up including the credential theft, also this has "Snake Keylogger" inside it per strings, as well as API.Telegram.org connections and possible SMTP c2 with email address

samples: 

EXE - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/089d065fe8e39f8b19a726cb15ac216e352a5576f446c5fc38486f1fbb7a1d9c/detection

links: 

https://twitter.com/neonprimetime/status/1389964247942279168

screenshots: 













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date: 4/29/2021

delivery: email [Subject: New PO#422328, ISO (PO#0422328.pdf.iso) w/ EXE inside (PO#04222328.pdf.exe)]

persistence: startup registry entry (hkcu\software\microsoft\currentversion\run, gqxRqe, c:\users\<userid>appdata\roaming\gqxRqe\gqxRqe.exe)

capabilities (per memory strings): Keylogger (KeyDown, KeyboardState), Credential Theft (UCBrowser, Vivaldi, Thunderbird, etc.)

c2s: unknown

identification method: strings in memory matching previously seen ( %mailaddres%%password%%smtp%%toemail% )

special notes: .net executable, link to torproject.org download in .net code, code for webrequest and smtpclient, double file extension (PO#04222328.pdf.exe), starts execution at about ~14 to 15mb initially, waits about 1 min 45 seconds, then relaunched itself, new pid, 2nd executable waits several minutes to do anything, only gets to ~17mb or 18mb, then checks for credentials (chrome, qqbrowser, ultravnc, thunderbird, waterfox, etc.) through disk and registry, in memory strings on 2nd end up including the credential theft

samples: 

ISO - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/f07b343d5a7b752a5b396b06174428a66ab98d8bb28bf33e9ea911797c32af2d/detection

EXE - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/83bcf31fc0d06b39c6cce6bc074cde9033f5e378f0104da887ec3f924f73376a/detection

links: 

https://twitter.com/neonprimetime/status/1387837559531786243

screenshots: 










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 date: 10/13/2020

delivery: email [Subject: Request for Quotation, Link to DOC (http://107.173.219[.]56/document ), downloads EXE from same domain ( http://107.173.219[.]56/tmt.exe ), runs Equation Editor exploit (EQNEDT32.EXE)]

persistence: unknown

capabilities (per memory strings): unknown

c2s: smtp.yandex[.]ru

identification method: twitter replies

special notes: child processes of "vbc.exe" and "RegAsm.exe"

samples: 

DOC - https://app.any.run/tasks/0410129a-646d-4c19-8207-081679403171/

links: 

https://twitter.com/neonprimetime/status/1316107602942668800

screenshots: 








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Threat Library - Hagga / Aggah

 Hagga / Aggah

 date: 11/18/2020

delivery: email [Subject: Order-PO500-18, Attachment: .PPT Powerpoint creates scheduled task]

persistence: scheduled task "lunkicharkhi" that runs downloads VBS script inside blogspot url (madarjaaatresearchers.blogspot[.com/p/thirdsaint3.html) and runs it with MSHTA)

capabilities (per memory strings): unknown

c2s: unknown

special notes: Powerpoint, scheduled task that connects to blogspot url runs VBS with MSHTA

samples: 

PPT - https://app.any.run/tasks/c896710d-c2e3-4bba-ba7a-cf801e9544cf/

VB Script - https://app.any.run/tasks/f6b585e9-e906-4882-942c-1bfb6cca666d/

links: 

https://twitter.com/neonprimetime/status/1330905903562940427

screenshots: 


















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Threat Library - Dridex

 Dridex

 date: 11/23/2020

delivery: email [Subject: Payment Advice, Attachment: .DOC with Office 365 logo, downloads more from hxxps://redin[.]redsla[.]com/laravelRedin/vendor/webmozart/assert/qDqNRqo3hREb.php]

persistence: unknown

capabilities (per memory strings): unknown

c2s: 173.249.20.233:8043

identification method: twitter replies

special notes: uses rundll32.exe to run a DLL it saved (c:\windows\temp\qtxzf.dll)

samples: 

DOC - https://app.any.run/tasks/92d94699-7ab0-4acc-8752-3bf23e662c7b/

links: 

https://twitter.com/neonprimetime/status/1330969313294028804

screenshots: 
















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Threat Library - Zloader

Zloader

 date: 2/26/2021

delivery: email [Subject: Invoicing info294564, Attachment: .DOC with plain text body asking to enable editing, downloads from findinglala[.]com]

persistence: unknown

capabilities (per memory strings): unknown

c2s: 

hxxps://timemeaning[.]com/post.php

hxxps://timeremain[.]com/post.php

hxxps://cacesatansingmilk[.]tk/post.php

hxxps://tenlapatevaj[.]tk/post.php

hxxps://toclylene[.]tk/post.php

identification method: twitter replies

special notes: user agent was "MSFrontPage/12.0"

samples: 

DOC - https://app.any.run/tasks/4df98427-fb86-4c7f-a082-1a2eb179e214/

links: 

https://twitter.com/neonprimetime/status/1365328294674112513

https://tria.ge/210219-g8t2kxnh8e

screenshots: 














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Threat Library - NJRAT / Bladabindi

NJRAT / Bladabindi

 date: 2/26/2021

delivery: email [Subject: Lease Agreement, Attachment: Zip (Lease Agreement.zip) w/ VBS Script inside (Lease Agreement.vbs), downloads from paste.ee/r/bsKo9 site]

persistence: unknown

capabilities (per memory strings): Keylogger ([ENTER], [TAP], get_CtrlKeyDown)

c2s: xxxcarldon.duckns[.]org

identification method: twitter replies

special notes: powershell with Unicode (airplanes and envelopes), url was reversed in code

samples: 

Zip - https://app.any.run/tasks/0874b873-2dde-4540-85f5-7ede1a1bfaf6/

links: 

https://twitter.com/neonprimetime/status/1365351048525791232

screenshots: 
















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Threat Library - Qakbot / Qbot

Qakbot / Qbot

 date: 4/15/2021

delivery: email [Link to Zip w/ XLSM inside , "Docusign logo themed", links ( บางสะพาน[.]com/hGQC4/catalogue-93.zip , xn--72c0bbr3dtble[.]com/hGQC4/catalogue-93.zip )

persistence: unknown

capabilities (per memory strings): unknown

c2s: 

rosenbaum-milan15y[.]ru[.]com/body.html

boehm-kavon15lc[.]ru[.]com/body.html

identification method: twitter replies

special notes: url was unicode/punycode

samples: 

XLSM - https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/387819/0/html

links: 

https://twitter.com/neonprimetime/status/1382743458494902274

screenshots: 












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Malware Threat Library Index

- Agent Tesla

- Aggah (same as Hagga)

Ave Maria (same as Warzone RAT)

- Bladabindi (same as NJRAT)

- Dridex

- Hagga (same as Aggah)

- NJRAT (same as Bladabindi)

- Qakbot (same as Qbot)

- Qbot (same as Qakbot)

Snake Keylogger 

Warzone RAT (same as Ave Maria)

- Zloader